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Abstract: 
 
This paper models the effect of a simple linear payroll  tax in a 
monopoly union model. Previously derived ambiguous results are 
given a more intuitive interpretation and conditions under which the 
effect on wages is unambiguously positive are given. It is shown 
that after tax wages are invariant to changes in the tax rate. 
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In a well known paper published in 1985 Andrew Oswald summarized the main comparative 
static results for the best known models of union behaviour, the monopoly union model and 
the efficient bargain model. The main purpose of this note is to demonstrate that one of the 
results, the impact of a payroll tax on wages, given there as ambiguous, can in fact be signed 
under certain conditions. Some other interesting properties are also derived of the model are 
explored. 
 
Recall that the monopoly union model is given by: 
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n is employment and is set by the firm as a function of the wage, m is membership, assumed 
exogenous, t is a proportional tax rate and s is a lump sum transfer.  The first order and second 
order conditions for a maximum are respectively: 
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Using the implicit function rule the sign of the effect of t on w is given by the partial 
derivative of the first order condition w.r.t t :  wt R Sign
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which is ambiguous. It would appear, as Oswald notes, that one cannot determine the 
qualitative effect of taxes on wages. Note however that (4) can be rewritten as: 
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So 1<  e is  sufficient but not necessary, given the absence of risk loving (i.e. given 
0 ) ( ' ' £ w u ), for the effect of taxes on wages to be positive.  If one assumes the lump sum 
transfer  is zero, s=0 then this simplifies further: 
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The parameter c is the coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion. This gives a simple necessary 
and sufficient condition for the effect of the tax rate on wages to be positive (or negative):  
 
Lemma 1: 
An increase in the payroll tax rate increases (decreases) the monopoly union's 
wage iff the sum of the elasticity of labour demand and the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is greater (less) than one. 
   
So the worker's marginal utility schedule and the firm's labour demand curve  must be jointly 
sufficiently curved. To get the magnitude of the effect depends on the second order condition 
so it is worth asking whether it is possible to say any more then the above result. The answer 
is yes if we assume a constant elasticity of labour demand. Let the firm be characterised by: 
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The elasticity of labour demand is given by  1
1
1
>
q -
” e .  Noting that: 
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The second order condition, after  some manipulation, can be rewritten as follows: 
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One can see at this point that the union's second order condition allows one to sign (4'') since 
the term in parentheses there is the same as in (3'). That is (3') implies c + e  -1 >0.  Assume 
henceforth that the elasticity of labour demand is, indeed, constant1. It follows that:  
 
Lemma 2: 
An increase in the payroll tax increases the monopoly union wage. 
Proof: 
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Given constant elasticity of demand, the effect of taxes is, in fact, unambiguously positive. 
Moreover the higher the tax rate is to begin with the more a given tax increase is passed on in 
higher wages. The (marginal) introduction of a tax has, to first order,  a unit elastic effect.  
 
The effect of a tax change on after-tax wages may be of more interest, to the workers at least: 
 
Corollary: 
The after-tax wage is invariant to changes in the tax rate. 
Proof: 
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This result could also be obtained by noting that (2) can be written in the form: 
( ) 0 . ) ( ) ( ). ( ' = e - w + w w b u u u  from which the constancy of  w follows immediately from the 
constancy of e . So an increase in the tax rate causes the union to pick a new wage sufficiently 
higher to leave net wages unchanged. This is quite a strong- and testable- result. It is not 
entirely surprising, however, since it is known that under the key assumption made here 
(constant elasticity of labour demand)  iso-elastic shifts in the labour demand curve or 
                                                                   
1 Santoni(1995) shows that another one of Oswald's results, the effect of an employment subsidy, relies on the 
implicit assumption that the labour demand curve is linear.   4
changes in the firm's price will leave the wage unchanged. Employment will be lower and the 
union worse off nonetheless.  
The revenue from the payroll tax levied on the workers in this firm is simply the tax rate times 
the wage bill R=t.w(t).n(w(t)). So one can derive two further propositions of interest: 
 
Lemma 3: 
An increase in the tax rate reduces the firm's wage bill. 
Proof: 
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This does not mean, of course, that the firm is better off since combining (7) with the 
Envelope Theorem shows that profits are decreasing in t. 
 
Lemma 4: 
The Laffer Curve slopes down iff t. e> 1 
Proof: 
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Following the early contributions of Oswald(1985) and Hersoug(1984) there is now a 
substantial theoretical literature on payroll taxes in unionized labour markets. These papers 
have typically had focused on issues of tax structure such as changes in progressivity (e.g. 
Koskela and Vilmounen(1996), Lockwood and Manning (1993), optimal taxation (e.g. 
Palokongas 1987, Boeters and Schneider(1999))  and typically have more complex forms of 
union/firm interaction such as bargaining models . In general these settings do not yield the 
simple results derived here and it would appear that they have been overlooked by recent 
developments.   5
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